

## **DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, MILITARY MANAGEMENT REFORM, ARE THEY ALWAYS ACCEPTABLE?**

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### **Abstract**

For a long time, the constitutional organization of the army was a taboo subject of which we had no right to approach it. This reality was accepted by all, police and researchers refrained from reflecting on the subject, the field of armies was therefore an opaque area managed by our governments, almost in secret and far from the eyes of the investigators.

The military institution has always contributed to this opacity by imposing the law of silence to safeguard its interests and the privileges of its leaders, sometimes to protect the regime and help keep it in place.

All the protests that Algeria experienced with even the last movement of Hirak had to change this situation. The evolution towards democracy would force the public power and even the army to lift all opacity by imposing the law of silence, sometimes to safeguard its interests and the privileges of its leaders and ultimately protect the regime and contribute to keep it in place.

Secret management must leave room for democratic and transparent management. This management must also be subjected to a control, by the arm that should exert the forces of society is it always true to accept this integration which that of knowing how far our armies are able to transform themselves in a windy general democracy?

This is a cost-effective challenge for all civilian and military actors, as it is a fundamental requirement for democratization. What are the principles that must govern the democratic management of the military and paramilitary forces can one control democratically in strength?

Although a military disengagement process referred to as Transition to Civil Rule was recently completed to what extent has the project of demilitarization been accomplished? Is military disengagement from politics synonymous with demilitarization? What is the linkage between demilitarization and democratization? How can be a democratic re-orientation of the state and civil society engineered in a country?

**Keywords:** Democratic Transition, Military Management Reform

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

For a long time, the constitutional organization of the army was a taboo subject of which we had no right to approach it. This reality was accepted by all, police and researchers refrained from reflecting on the subject, the field of armies was therefore an opaque area managed by our governments almost in secret and far from the eyes of the investigators.

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These are some issues which this paper seeks to address. Our objective is to provide a theoretical and of course, practical basis, through which a stable democratic order can be negotiated and achieved in our country.

## **2. SECURITY REFORM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, WHICH CONCORDANCE?**

Reforms in the security sector in a military institution, in a period of democratic transition, remain ambiguous. The question is essentially legal, consequently the lawyer was not used to advise in this kind of exercise. It is necessary to have a diversified disciplinary background to manage the security issue beyond security governance, which gives rise to a strange institutional affiliation that is also strategic in a context of democratic transition. It is necessary to identify and accept one side of the formal actors and informal actors who are all part of this safe community.

On the institutional side, it is important in a context of democratic transition to say that a governance, and therefore the existence of a set or the establishment of a set of norms of values and operations that make the sector security is subject to or even standard of efficiency, and equality of responsibility that purpose other public service and this thus leads us to identify, to put in place the values and aptitudes which form a decisions concerning security and their implementation. What choice to adapt for a successful democratic reform of security institutions? What is the way to assert the legitimacy and credibility of the government?

The reform of the visual security sector to strengthen the governance of the security sector, through the effectiveness and efficiency of security in the conditions of surveillance and democratic control.

Irrespective of the reality of confrontational or post dictatorial posture, the greatest challenge is how to reduce the gap, the theory implied by the values and principles, to the reality and the constraints of the context. Through a number of special experiences, and in South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Morocco, opportunities for reform of the security sector and security sector governance have been noted also limited this reform.

The security institution for complete democratic management of the security sector in view, for greater efficiency and effectiveness; this is where the notion of security sector reform comes in because often there will be a good deal of confusion between security sector governance and security sector reform, but these are two separate, but certainly complementary, processes that proceed different logic.

Speaking of effectiveness and efficiency, there is a question of a balance between two priorities that are effective on the one hand and responsibility on the other, which is a very important aspect that is an intrinsic component of the reform of the governance pillar. at times omitted and marginalized, such a dysfunction between efficiency and responsibility which gives the legitimacy of the use of the means of the public power but in all responsibility and within the framework of the responsibility of the transparency and the respect of the rule of law.

In addition, reform remains imperfect due to lack of political governance and a lack of operational governance of the reform. One of the vectors of security sector reform still falls short of the demands and

expectations, it is the civil authority that exercises control over the security sector in a democratically elected assembly that exercises a legislative function in the legality of form.

### **3. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND RISK OF SKIDDING**

In all the countries of the Mande, the army is a particular body, a body that has its rules, a body that stands at a certain margin of society. The army, which holds what is called legitimate violence, which immediately puts into question the use of this legitimate violence, the army in the sense of continuity, considers that even if it is not its role in the constitution, it has a role to play in the preservation of the state, the continuity of the state, the territorial continuity of the country and therefore the world can change around it but arm it the tendency to continue, she is, the guarantor of some type of nations security structure.

In addition, the army is contained by the people despite all the events including the Hirak of February 22, 2019 so must insist that the army remains and will remain the trust of the people. All the risks that an army poses on a country come mainly from the position of the policy towards its army. Politics is afraid of the military and it has two solutions:

- Either he decides to weaken the army to be overthrown.
- Either he buys it and therefore an army is compromised, in the second case with power through, benefits of complicity, involvement in politics, it is obviously extremely worrying especially in some contexts in which the army is entrusted with the task of guarantying institutions in the constitution itself, it may be the result of the struggle for liberation, which gives them a role of liginula, which surpasses all others. He may declare a popular army which will act in the name of the people.

The army can think of the diversity of a power that no one has really entrusted to it, and has led to weigh on it deserves, risks and then in the population, there are also people who volunteer to appeal to the army, which belongs to the action of the army, because they are afraid of disorder. All this leads a number of army to make the choice to intervene, often to the great satisfaction of the population.

It must be emphasized that the army is not able, whatever the country, to govern; and few are the army that they have had the wisdom, which have far discoveries, even if it is not desirable to withdraw and pass the continuation to the civil power.

Finally the finding of the impaction of the army in the civil life to reduce all the possible risks of the disorder reveals bad or insufficient. This factual analysis of military management in state affairs remains poorly controlled and never settles the future of the legitimacy of power. We must therefore shine with armed forces and clear all attempts and corruption. We must promote exchanges with foreign armies through training and training to breathe a wind of openness of experiences and discovery of what others are doing, all this forces the military to behave like a rampart against the authoritarian regime or a secure and reliable accompaniment in an approach towards a better society respectful of the rule of law if not, in all the intellectual constructions which aim to envisage a democratic control of an army in a system which is not him -the same rule of law, is completely misleading and deceptive, because everyone knows that this can be diverted and that in fact there is no possibility of democratic control of the armed forces if it does not. There is no aboit and above all a rule of law.

### **4. THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AS CORRECTIVE REGIMES: IS IT ALWAYS ACCEPTABLE IN ALGERIA?**

In Algeria, military rulers have taken precedence over the politics of dialogue, negotiation and consensus riots, armed conflicts, violent inter-communal clashes, wars, rebellions, are some of the features of political life.

The effects of political conflicts in Algeria have been quite damaging to the Algerian society; increasing poverty, hunger, diseases, and escalating refugee problems.

In Algeria, the military in the last 29 years elicited tremendous conflicts in society. The militarization of politics and the denial of political space to civil society groups by the military provoked severe conflicts in the Algerian society.

The political misrule and economic mismanagement of the military during this period, exacerbated the

contradictions in the political economy<sup>1</sup> Violence became the norm of social and political life. The state itself relished in the culture of violence and virulent repressions of its citizens.

Although a military disengagement process referred to as Transition to Civil Rule was recently completed to what extent has the project of demilitarization been accomplished? Is military disengagement from politics synonymous with demilitarization? What is the linkage between demilitarization and democratization? How can be a democratic re-orientation of the state and civil society engineered in a country?

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## **5. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DISENGAGEMENT DICHOTOMY**

The history of political roles of Algeria is noteworthy to be investigated. Many of the details of these events are presented in the context of regional dynamics, as well as the economics and inherited patterns of civil-military relations.

Much has been written about military intervention conditions but much less however has been written about military disengagement. There is also a lot of work on military involvement in politics, but not much on its disengagements<sup>2</sup>. Because that is no concept for the study of military disengagement from politics and somehow democratization has emerged and been widely embraced by some scholars. At the same time, most of the students of military disengagement have drawn a simple dichotomy, based on duration and impetus.

Discussion of military disengagement is based on how to maintain stability. Military professionalism Strategies applied to control civil society. Several theoretical models in the literature of civil-military relations are meant by how to establish civilian control of the army. Mechanisms for military withdrawal can be identified in many dominant models in literature of military relations written by both Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz in particular<sup>3</sup>.

Continuity of civil-military interactions in the form of a flexible politician would ensure that the integration of the armed forces, mainly related to the nature of some technologies driving pressures and crises that would bring the attention of the army.

According to Welch suggestions, there are three approaches to improve and promote civilian control of the armed forces:

- The first approach: fixing the behavior of the officers and politicians.
- The second approach is centered on the introductions to weaken the military intervention by improving and strengthening the legitimacy of the political system and its effectiveness.

The third approach: contribute to raise the economic development levels as a fact encouraging the army to intervene in most Third World countries<sup>4</sup>.

Samuel Huntington, considered relationship of military power as a phenomenon separates political and distinct in the field of political science.

Huntington argues for neutral politician and professional military that is isolated from politics. He notes that national security is best served under conditions of "objective civilian control".

According to Huntington, objective civil control maximizes military professionalism, making the military as a tool of the state and guaranteeing its distinctive existence. As a consequence, the political leadership should seek to maximize military professionalism. At the same time, the military leadership should not acquire political influence. Instead, they should respect the "realism of political autonomy".

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<sup>1</sup> Matomola Vincent Mwange, *Civil-Military Relations in Namibia 1990-2005*, thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil in the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South, Africa, 2009.

<sup>2</sup> CE. Welch, *Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes of Random Events?* *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol 18, No.3. Spring, 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Peter D. Feaver, *The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control*, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.23, No.2, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Claude Emerson Welch, *Strategies of civilian control : some concluding observation*

## **6. STRATEGIC PROCESS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL**

Two contradictory ways to the urbanization of the army, argued that

Provides objective civilian control and raise levels of military force as well as it reduces political interference of the army, while applying the self-control.

a) Objective Civilian control: This strategy proposes the leadership of the civil authority of political involving the army, but without exposure and interference in the autonomy of the Army. Huntington argues strategy censorship objectivity generate balance in the distribution of principal power between the political and the military, explaining that the objective control lays the foundation for a civil military provides security of the army and believe the recognition of the autonomy of the professional military. In control systems objectivity, army is capable of owning autonomy in implementing the goals of the state at the time enjoyed the politicians.

The political objectives of the state, meaning the army is obliged to implement the wishes of civilians against the recognition of the latter's independence in military matters and is what keeps officers as part of a politically neutral professional ethics.

The control strategy objectivity to ensure the autonomy of the military area of purely military in exchange for the withdrawal of civilians from the internal affairs of the Army lead to the creation of military subordination to civilians.

Huntington claimed that this strategy of military professionalism and made it to state machine is politically biased and less a threat to the wider civil society.

b) Subject civilian control: professionalism and sterilize the army politically for ideological army. Participation of the army in politics raises the levels of civilian oversight to the highest level through the urbanization of the army and politicized what makes political life continue, as denying this strategy and the presence of professional independent of the rest of the organizations and institutions of the state.

Morris Janowitz (founder of military sociology) presented the first sociological study for the military institution where he studied the Army as a whole by trying to analyze the pilot after central to his institutional and use this perception as a basis for proposing changes that would encourage the army to assume civilian control. Dealing with the army as a system where it becomes a social feature professional body for different officers over time.

Morris Janowitz has contended that Huntington's "traditional" military professionalism is being replaced by "pragmatic professionalism". Although the military does not participate directly in politics, he argues, it is strongly linked to the political system and the state.

Janowitz advocates a military as a 'constabulary force', which is integrated into civilian society, shares society's common values and maintains a wide political perspective 'the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture'.

Janowitz opposed Huntington's idea of military subordination based on a clear differentiation in functions and responsibilities in the development of ethics and non-interference of civilians in military issues, ensures the political neutrality of the army. He also argues that subordination of military support only if there is in general involvement in the values of society<sup>1</sup>

## **7. DEMILITARIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL LINKAGE**

The concept of demilitarization implies the "disengagement" or "withdrawal" of the military from the political life. Militarization is viewed as the armed build-up and engagement of society, through military coups, authoritarian regimes, war, armed conflicts, internal military intervention and the dominance of powerful military and repressive state apparatuses; while militarism refers to entrance in society of symbols, values discourses validating military power.

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<sup>1</sup> José Javier Olivas Osuna, *Civilian Control of the Military in Portugal and Spain: a Policy Instruments Approach* A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2012.

The implicit assumption in the above conception of demilitarization therefore is that as the military withdraws from the political life, these identified practices and norms associated with militarization and militarism would be vitiated and society would seek a civil balance.

However, this concept is more formalistic and structural, rather than process-based, and does not capture the balance in the notion of demilitarization. The problematic of this meaning arises primarily from its simplistic symmetry between militarization/militarism and military rule. The point to emphasize is that the practice of militarization and militarism is not synonymous with only military rule (but present also in civil regimes) hence, these practices do not simply get abrogated with the withdrawal of the military from the political life. Especially, post-military states usually have well established norms and practices of military from the political life. Especially, post-military states usually have well established norms and practices of militarism which are not easily eradicated with the transfer of political power from the military of civilians.

Demilitarization must include the deconstruction of the ideological and institutional structures of militarism and authoritarian conception, and the reassertion of civil control and democratic culture over the organs of the state, economy and civil society. The latter (i.e. civil society) although outside the state arena, usually gets acculturated with the symbols, language, values and norms of militarism under military rule, which require being addressed and deconstructed in a post-military era.

It is when demilitarization is conceived in this wide sense that it provides a linkage with the concept of democratization. Democratization involves Huntington suggested that objective control is most pronounced in democracies, while the prevailing models of control self more Frequently in cases of non-democratic, and further assert that the civil sector is better off if it refrains from military matters. Otherwise, the military benefits of keeping away about politics, levels of national security are better off under the control of objectivity.

Huntington's idea is that objective civilian control is preferable to subjective control, since the best guarantor for military subordination to political supremacy is a truly professional military. In Huntington's opinion, subjective civilian control maximizes civilian power by both civilianizing and politicizing the military, by making it politically dependent and by denying the military a distinct professionalism that is clearly different from that of other organization in society.

The creation and expansion of the political space for multiple actors to interact, negotiate, compete, and seek political self-realization, within set and permissible rules. Democratization should be viewed not as an event, but a continuous process. Democracy and political as an argument for the Algerian decision

Algerian's record of political instability has raised the issue of democratic experiment. Against this background, there is an emerging body of literature on the subject. Proper political engineering which helps to establish the right social structures and which facilitates the emergence of a new-breed of patriotic and self-less class of civilian politicians will create an enduring democratic system freed of the military coups. In effect, most of the prescriptions for a politically stable of African states are anchored on the premise that military coups in Africa are precipitated by the moral and other inadequacies of civilian politicians.

The current transition is premised on the belief that political stability can be created if corruption, unpatriotism, incompetence and inefficiency in Africa are prevented from acquiring political power. It is this belief that necessitated the ban imposed on certain categories of African countries.

As long as the military believes that it has a duty (a self-imposed duty at that) to intervene in politics and throw out 'bad' rules, there will be no end to military coups. Both military and civilian rulers use the state as a tool for private ends, as such, military officers are as corrupt (if not more corrupt than) as civilian politicians. Thus, we totally reject the argument that coups are precipitated by civilian misrule. What civilian misrule does is to provide an alibi for military coups, it does not cause coups. It is the military monopoly over the instruments of coercion that gives it advantage over other groups in over throwing governments?

Political stability in Africa requires more than the twin goals of excluding 'bad' Africans from political power and the rigorous attempt to create a greater degree of cohesion within the bourgeoisie class, in as much as these goals will serve the class in interests of the African bourgeoisie, they are largely irrelevant to the material interests of the mass of the African people. Real political stability in Africa requires the democratization of the economy, the restructuring of the military to make it defend the material interests of the majority of African people, the elimination of foreign control of African economy and the democratization of society at all levels. The current transition program does not attempt to accomplish any of these goals and as such, it will not lay the foundations (contrary to authoritarian regimes 'expectations) for stable, democratic and prosperous nations of Africa, namely Algeria.

## **CONCLUSION**

Military regimes have dominated politics in Algeria since its independence, where governments have been removed by coups. Force has not only dominated the formal political system, but also threatened the economic and social basis on which democratic processes and progressive development depends. For many years military rule and sometimes civil war have destroyed lives, skills, competence and accountability, suppressed autonomous organizations in civil society, an intensified ethnic hostility and conflict.

By 1990, Algeria should adopt a new form of government bases mainly on the rule of the armed forces and the police utilizing the proper basis for securing the compliance of citizens with the laws of the policy.

The coups d'état in the years of the last century have posed fundamental challenges to the nation. On the one hand, they have brought out the worst in Algerian politics: repression, intimidation, violence, corruption, betrayals, and the manipulation of primordial loyalties. On the other hand, it has exposed the nature and extent of the Algerian politics, and provided the still weak and fledgling civil society with added strength and legitimacy. Could the resurgence of military rule have been predicted? Could anyone have foreseen that military leaders would become such an all-powerful? Was it possible to anticipate the popular protests? What is the way forward for the contending political community?

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