

## South Caucasus and the Global Geopolitics

Erik Davtyan

Gyulbekyan st. 38A-28, 0051 Yerevan, Republic of Armenia  
komitas2010@gmail.com

**Keywords:** Geopolitics, International relations, South Caucasus

**Abstract.** The research presents the analysis of geopolitical developments of the South Caucasus since the collapse of the USSR. The research aims at investigating the role of the South Caucasus in world geopolitics, the balance of power in the region and the circumstances providing the balance, geopolitical interests of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the trilateral interaction between these states, as well as Russia, Turkey, USA, European Union, the clash of national interests of above mentioned states. Current research also scrutinizes the role of the regional conflicts (issues of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh). In order to accomplish the presentation of the topic and to provide a complete notion about the geopolitics in South Caucasus and its place in world geopolitics, a comparative analysis is given over the regional developments of 1990s and those of 2000s.

Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as neighboring states hardly manage to solve the challenges of international regional relations, still leaving a myriad of issues unsolved. Due to new realities the South Caucasus has entered the first decade of the XXI century, being transformed into a geopolitically more important region as well as gaining energy and transit significance for global geopolitical powers. Aforesaid constitutes the main accent of the research

### 1. Introduction

The whole world with its approximately 200 states is divided into continents, which are in their turn divided into regions and sub-regions. This type of classification lies in the background of geographical studies, but while studying geopolitics, the main emphasis is made on *geopolitical* but not geographical regions.

In geopolitical terms, the definition of the word “region” is conditioned not only by geographical criteria, but also by political, military, economic, demographical and other aspects. It means that the states of a certain geographical area, their foreign and home policies, interstate relations, the emergence of new states or the collapse of older ones, the creation and decline of regional and world empires, the system of the balance of power, the economic relations, the existence or the lack of raw materials, military capabilities and the level of national defense, the demographic status, the correlation between all peoples living in those countries, as well as demographical explosions or just the opposite processes and many other realities condition the emergence of *geopolitical* regions.

Analysing the dynamics of the creation and the evaluation of geopolitical regions, we can assert that states, belonging to a certain region, have similarities in multilayered challenges they face

during a concrete period.

Coming to conclusion, it should be underlined that *geopolitical regions may change because of the above mentioned circumstances; some states may be included and excluded or the region may be reorganized as an absolutely new one*. The history shows us how many geopolitical regions and areas have emerged and disappeared in time. In order to understand the phenomenon of the term “South Caucasus” and its origins some historical examples should be examined. During the rule and supremacy of the Roman Empire the whole world was geopolitically divided into 2 huge regions: one of them included all countries within the Roman Empire, the other consisted of the Germanics, Celts, Carthaginians, Iberians, Thracians, Persians and other nations which were not under the Roman governance. This one was called “Barbarian world”. During the Cold war a new geopolitical region emerged, *Western Europe*, which included the member states of the European integration processes and was not under the communist regime. After the collapse of the USSR as well as the creation and enlargement of the European Union, this term became useless because of radical geopolitical changes. Thus, the term was paraphrased into “European Union” itself. Similarly, after the decline of the Soviet Union the term “post-Soviet region” emerged which nowadays includes all former Soviet republics, somehow connected with the Russian Federation.

In current geopolitical realities South Caucasus may be defined as a region which consists of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, including unrecognized (or partly recognized) Republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. If we take into consideration the fact that the Russian Federation, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the *neighboring* states of the region, which have a direct impact on the formation of the geopolitical situation in the region, they may be considered as “*indirect member-states*” of the South Caucasus.

## **2. Emergence of the geopolitical region: the term “South Caucasus”**

Historically the geographical area, which nowadays stands for South Caucasus, is one of the ancient places inhabited by human being. In old times the South Caucasus was a part of a greater geopolitical region, called “*Armenian highland*” which lies mainly in the current territories of Turkey, Armenia, and in some parts of Georgia and Azerbaijan, covering approximately 400.000 km<sup>2</sup> [1]. In that period of history the highland was covered mainly by the kingdom of Armenia, which served as a buffer state between Roman (later Byzantine) Empire and Persian state. Later, when the Ottoman Empire came to the political arena and the Ottoman-Safavid wars started, Armenian highland disappeared as a separate geopolitical region.

The origins of the contemporary South Caucasus came from the treaty of Zuhab or Qasr-e Shirin (1639) which confirmed the passage of the South Caucasian territories (except for western Georgia) to the Safavid Persia [2]. As a result, South Caucasus totally became the northern part of the Persian state and therefore succumbed to both economic and political compactification.

The next phase came after the first quarter of the 19-th century, i.e. after the Russian-Ottoman (1806-1812, 1828-1829) and Russian-Persian wars (1804-1813, 1826-1828). This was the period when the Russian Empire conquered almost all parts of the South Caucasus and called it Transcaucasia (in Russian- *Zakavkaz'e*). Thus, a new geopolitical region emerged within the Russian Empire. Taking into consideration the fact that the region remained under the Russian control more than 150 years (including the Soviet period), the word “*Transcaucasia*” was naturally dominant till 1990s.

Why was the region called Transcaucasia? The point is that the region was renamed according to the geopolitical mentality of St. Petersburg, which perceived it as a territory situated on the other side of Caucasian mountains. Besides, it was in accordance with the foreign policy doctrine of the Russian Empire, according to which Russian Empire should enhance its borders to the south, especially to the Mediterranean sea, therefore all future conquests would also be perceived as Transcaucasia.

In 1990s, when the consistent countries of the region gained independence, Transcaucasia was not accepted in the global geopolitical studies as Russian inner geopolitical region. In order to paraphrase the region and to correspond to the current socio-economic and political realities of the world and especially those of that region, the term “*South Caucasus*” emerged in the global geopolitics. It is worth mentioning that the term “South Caucasus” is not correct in geographical terms: the point is that the Caucasus (both northern and southern) is situated mainly in the Russian Federation and only northern parts of Azerbaijan and Georgia may be considered to be South Caucasus. To shape a firm notion about the geographical and geopolitical differences of the region it should be stated, that the southern interstate borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan with Iran are a couple of hundred kilometers far from the Caucasus Mountains. Nevertheless, in geopolitical analysis “South Caucasus” is an acceptable variant and merely the ultimate term for that region.

### **3. Geopolitics in South Caucasus: review of 1990s**

The geopolitical complex of the South Caucasus is mainly generated by the interaction between Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan as well as neighboring states and “Western actors” (the EU and the USA). The main characteristic feature of the region is the presence of ethnic conflicts among almost all states. Conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia highly affect trilateral relations. Besides, confidential conflicts exist between Turkey and Georgia (over Ajaria, especially during the period of de facto independence of the province under its protégé, Aslan Abashidze), as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan (over Kvemo Kartli). The point is that the confidential conflicts have never been expressed in the political way because of the high level of bilateral relations [3,4]. All of these conflicts have historical background, being stipulated by the clash of national interests. The point is that during the period of Russian rule they had confidential feature and could not openly emerge anyway. Besides, the territorial divisions, organized by the Russian government, intended to put a delayed-action bomb in South Caucasus, as they were deliberately made on the antinational principle. It is quite obvious, that in case of creation of nation-states the conflicts will inevitably erupt and be transformed into military confrontations. This can be easily confirmed by studying the history of South Caucasian republics in the period between the collapse of Russian Empire and the establishment of Soviet regimes in the region (1918-1921). That is the reason why the geopolitics of South Caucasus in 1918-1920 has many similarities with that of 2000s.

Coming to the modern era, we should state that the emergence of independent Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan opened a new phase for the geopolitics of not only South Caucasus but also Middle East. The gradual decline of the USSR in late 1980s and its collapse in 1991 caused a geopolitical vacuum, i.e. the balance of power, which was maintained by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union before, was heavily undermined. Thus, the lack of balance inevitably made some conflicts erupt. This took place in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These conflicts have had a fundamental influence on the formation of the South Caucasus as a separate geopolitical region, playing a dominant role even after 20 years and highly affecting the foreign policy of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as the Russian, US, Turkish, Iranian and European policy in South Caucasus.

The military clashes over the above mentioned territories started in 1991-1992 and were transformed into classical wars. The result was the following: Abkhazia and South Ossetia successfully protected themselves against Georgia, the Nagorno (Mountainous) Karabakh Republic protected its independence from Azerbaijani military aggression.

Geopolitically the existence of ethnic conflicts in a region supposes the possibility of political (in some cases military) intervention by more powerful states. In other words, ethnic clashes and wars promote a unique chance for great powers to take the role of mediator and therefore influence the foreign policy of belligerent parties, even spreading their zone of influence over them.

Perceiving such kind of geopolitical nuances, Russia immediately launched a chain of steps to restore its influence over the region. During the war of 1991-1994 between Azerbaijani Republic

and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) Russian foreign policy supported both parts generally through its air forces in order to undermine both Armenian and Azerbaijani military and political potential and to ease the reinstallation of Russian supremacy in the South Caucasus. That is the reason why the ultimate truce of Bishkek, signed by representatives of the NKR as well as Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, was mediated by the Russian defense minister, Pavel Grachev. Armenian victory over Azerbaijan made Turkish government unilaterally close the Armenian-Turkish border, which highly bolstered the Russian influence in Armenia and undermined any possibility for the US political or economic penetration.

The same took place in other conflicts. As a result of warfare in Abkhazia (1992-1993, 1998) and South Ossetia (1991-1992), Georgia lost its control over Abkhazia which de facto survives under the auspices of the Russian Federation. As to South Ossetia, it was occupied by Russian, Georgian and North Ossetian military forces. On the other hand, Armenia is the only state in South Caucasus where Russia has located its military base till now. Russian military bases in Georgia served to their destination generally in 1990s, guarding the Turkish-Georgian interstate border. After the joint statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia at the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999 Russian forces were step by step withdrawn from Georgia [5].

Summarizing the Russian factor on the regional geopolitics of 1990s, we conclude that, despite the independent status of South Caucasus, it still remained under the Russian sphere of influence. The presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the existence of Russian military base in Armenia and Georgia, the unsolved dispute over Nagorno Karabakh obviously ensured Russian supremacy over the region till the Rose revolution of Georgia in 2003.

Meanwhile, in 1990s other geopolitical actors failed to take part in tumultuous events in South Caucasus. The US attempts to play a leading role in the region through Turkey failed because of the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border in 1993. Another attempt was initialized by the Islamic Republic of Iran, trying to be a mediator in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The president of Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, even hosted a meeting of leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Yagub Mammadov, on May 8, 1992. Nevertheless, any attempt to balance the region without Russia was sentenced to death.

The geopolitical vacuum, which emerged at the end of 1991, was immediately refilled by the Russian Federation due to the serious clash of national interests in South Caucasus. The main characteristic feature of the geopolitics of the region in 1990s was the dominance of the military component in regional international relations and the frequency of wars. During a decade-long period (1991-2001) 5 wars have been recorded: Nagorno Karabakh war (1991-1994), Abkhazian wars in 1992-1993 and 1998, the South Ossetian war in 1991-1992 and the Kodori Crisis in 2001. The existence of Russian military bases in Armenia and Georgia, the extremely huge number of military clashes made Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan geopolitically weak and devoid of any possibility for a complimentary foreign policy and shift in geopolitical balance of the South Caucasus against Russia.

#### **4. South Caucasus after the Rose revolution in Georgia (2003)**

The focal point in geopolitical studies of the South Caucasus is the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which took place in November of 2003 and totally reformed the geopolitical structure of the region that had existed since 1991. The overthrow of the former regime, the resignation of the second president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili's entrance into the political arena have had very serious consequences both for the USA and the neighboring states of Georgia. Besides, it had a huge contribution to the rise of the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus in the context of global developments.

The début of Mikheil Saakashvili symbolized the gradual decline and ultimately the end of the Russian hegemony in Georgia and partly in South Caucasus. The revolution simultaneously marked the strengthening of the US positions, which highly undermined Russian foreign policy goals in the

region.

Confirming a radically different foreign policy doctrine, newly formed government of Georgia adopted a strictly anti-Russian stance, which alternatively supposed US-oriented foreign policy. According to the National Security Concept of Georgia, “*Georgia aspires to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which will enable it to consolidate its democracy and strengthen its national security*” [6]. Under Saakashvili’s presidency, Georgia initiated a new policy towards the neighboring states. One of the characteristic features of that “new regional policy” was *the strategic, deep and multilayered cooperation and collaboration with Turkey and Azerbaijan*, which was to play a significant role in Georgian new diplomacy, therefore it was later underpinned as one of the vital provisions of the National Security Concept of Georgia.

In short, the concept of an absolutely new foreign policy aimed at westernization of Georgia in almost all fields of state affairs. The implementation of the strategy was initialized immediately after the formation of the new political system.

In reality, the geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus started through the total withdraw of the Russian troops from Georgia (in 2006) and reached its apogee in August of 2008 when the Russian-Georgian war occurred. Though the reformation of the region was in process at the very first steps of Saakashvili’s administration, the progress was going on gradually, sustaining more or less tolerable and balanced relations with Russia. The Russian-Georgian war accelerated the process of total westernization of Georgia and the formation of political, economic, financial and military strong ties with the USA and other Western states.

Logically, the stiffened stance towards Russia and the dangerously explosive situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would sooner or later cause a military conflict between Russia and Georgia. The Russian-Georgian war (8-16 August, 2008) has had serious geopolitical consequences on the regional affairs. Firstly, Georgia lost any opportunity to restore its territorial integrity: Georgian forces were expelled both from South Ossetia and the rest of Abkhazia (Georgian troops had formerly taken control over the Kodori valley). Besides, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were officially recognized by Russia as independent states. Secondly, the loss of disputable territories and the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia left no other alternative and automatically torpedoed the creation of US-Georgian block on anti-Russian background. US-Georgian relations entered a new phase, which was equally based on reciprocal need. In order to prove that, the US president George W. Bush visited Tbilisi in 2005, thus emphasizing Georgian importance for the US regional policy, as none of the US presidents has ever visited South Caucasus or Central Asia before [7]. Both parties simultaneously launched a wide cooperation in military affairs, especially in 2002-2005 when the US helped Georgia in the enhancement of the capabilities of its troops [8].

The US and European economic and financial penetration in Georgia highly undermined the balance in the region, depriving Russia of the possibility to exercise pressure on Georgia. Thirdly, the new geopolitical situation supposed a rapid activation of Georgian-Turkish and Georgian-Azerbaijani relations in political, economic, financial and even military spheres. Trilateral relations were rearranged according to a new format, confirmed in the Trabzon Declaration in 2012, which set up trilateral cooperation on Euro-Atlantic integration process, reiterating the three states’ longstanding policy of the inviolability of sovereign borders [9]. Turkish and Azerbaijani direct investments highly augmented in Georgia: e.g. in 2002-2010 Turkish-Georgian trade barter reached \$1billion (previously \$240 million) [10]. Simultaneously, Azerbaijani population grows in Georgia, especially in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Kakheti. In general, the war was in interests of Turkey and Azerbaijan as the closure of Russian border and its huge market strengthened Georgian dependence upon these states in economic, financial and energy fields.

The South Ossetian war imposed a negative impact on the geopolitical environment of Armenia as the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia excluded any possibility to restore the Georgian-Abkhazian railway, which is actually the only railway, uniting Armenia with Russia. The thaw in Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan relations, an immediate augmentation of Turkic

investments and Turkic population near the northern borders of Armenia, as well as Georgia's use as a transit state have created a serious threat to the national security of the Republic of Armenia. Such circumstances strengthened Armenian dependence on Russian support both in military and economic spheres. Reciprocally Armenia became the most reliable point through which the Russian Federation preserved the balance in the region. It was not by accident that in 2011 Russia and Armenia signed an agreement on the prolongation of the Russian military base presence till 2044[11]. As to the economic aspect, the trade barter between two states has reached \$1.3 billion (in 2012), meanwhile in 2010 it was \$859.1 million, in 2004- \$208.4 million [12,13].

As to Russia and Azerbaijan, any remarkable shift did not take place in bilateral relations. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Turkish factor highly counterbalances the Russian policy towards Azerbaijan. Due to the multilayered deep and comprehensive cooperation and strategic partnership between two Muslim states, Russia holds a relatively distanced policy in Azerbaijan. Besides, Azerbaijani geopolitics has a unique feature, which differs from that of Armenia or Georgia. That feature is the *oil factor*, expressed even in 1990s, when British companies launched an "informal war" against Russian attempts to install monopoly in the oil industry of Azerbaijan. The "contract of the century" (September 20, 1994) and the creation of a joint consortium ("Azerbaijan International Operating Company") with leading US-British shares have disabled Russian economic hegemony in Azerbaijan till now [14]. The most efficient tool through which Russia partly keeps Azerbaijan under pressure remains the unsolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan is keen on restoring its so-called "sovereignty" over the disputable territory, but the point is that the vague perspectives over the solution of the conflict guarantees Russian presence in the region. As long as the conflict remains unsolved, Russian influence in South Caucasus will be secured.

*In short*, after the Russian-Georgian war and the strengthening of the US positions in Georgia, the newly formed geopolitical situation left no other choice for Russia but to preserve its influence through three strategic levers: 1) the Russian 102<sup>nd</sup> military base in Armenia, 2) the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, 3) the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan (actually supposed from the "2").

As to the Russian-Georgian relations in the postwar period, any remarkable change did not occur. During the second presidential term of Mikheil Saakashvili Georgian foreign policy was constructed predominantly on anti-Russian background and at a rougher stance than in 2003-2008. The consciousness of the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia made Tbilisi much more obstinate. That is the reason why the Russian diplomacy tries to press in political and especially economic spheres in order to prevent the creation of the US-Georgian block.

The geopolitics of 2000s in South Caucasus has two more characteristic features: *the gradual emergence of a new actor, the European Union, and the rise of transit energy projects*. Each of these phenomena has great perspectives and can even play a strategic role in future international relations of the South Caucasus. The first one is connected with the new policy of the European Union, which was formalized through a program called "Eastern partnership". The project officially started on May 7, 2009, presenting a model of deep and comprehensive cooperation between the EU and six member states of the project: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. In geopolitical sense, the "Eastern Partnership" supposes reconstruction of bilateral relations through deep and comprehensive free trade agreements as well as association agreements. Thus, the project aims at deepening economic relations and bolstering European economic and financial potential in the South Caucasus, which challenges the Russian markets in the same region and somehow hinders its monopoly. Besides, the region is a part of the TRACECA program (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) which actually secures European permanent interest towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia [15].

The other characteristic feature is the rise of transit energy projects in the region. The point is that the emergence of energy projects in South Caucasus has highly raised the geopolitical importance of the region in the world. According to the National Security Concept of Georgia, "the

strengthening of the transit role of Georgia” is considered to be one of the most important goals of the Georgian government, which automatically enables the implementation of infrastructural and energy programs in South Caucasus. The results appeared in 2006 when Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey officially realized the “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan” (BTC) oil pipeline project, which transports Azerbaijani oil to Europe [16]. Actually, the BTC is the first project which supplies oil to Europe, circumventing the Russian Federation. Being supported by the US and European oil companies, the program suggests profitable perspectives for the USA and especially the UK, which has remarkable shares in the BTC. The realization of an oil pipeline project, which starts at the western shores of the Caspian sea, enables the fulfillment of pipeline projects with Central Asian states. Starting from the BTC pipeline, all alternative supply projects correspond to the US principle of “*multiple pipelines*”, i.e. diversification of oil supplies among Russia, BTC (Azerbaijani oil fields) and Turkmenistan [17].

At the regional level, the BTC is lucrative for the progress of trilateral relations between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: due to oil transportation tariffs, Georgia provides a profit of \$62.5 million per year [18]. As to Turkey, its enormous market is 65-75% dependent on important energy supplies, which are provided by the most credible state for Turkey, Azerbaijan [19]. Meanwhile the BTC has negative impact on geopolitics of Armenia and Russia, as the first is excluded from regional energy programs and deprived of all profits that are gained from regional cooperation processes. As to Russian interests, the BTC enlarges the US and British economic presence in South Caucasus and reduces the European dependence from the Russian oil, ensuring the energy security of the EU. In the same way gas (Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) and railway (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars) projects are planned to be realized in the future. If the first one will transport natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to central Europe, circumventing Russia and Iran, the second one will serve the national interests of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, isolating Armenia through infrastructural facilities. The gas project is actually the second initiation, seriously challenging the Russian energy policy. According to respective statistics, in 2006 the half of the European gas was supplied by Russia. Hence, alternative gas supply will undoubtedly reduce European dependence from Russian Gazprom, causing rearrangement of energy policy and South Caucasian geopolitics on the whole [20].

In its turn, Russia tries to counterbalance all these programs through Eurasian integration process, firstly putting the emphasis on Armenia, then on Georgia and Azerbaijan, which is a matter of concern both for the USA and the EU [21,22].

## 5. Summary

Analysing the geopolitical evolution of the South Caucasus, comparing the regional international relations in 1990s and 2000s, researching the political, economic, military and other realities in a period of nearly 20 years, some conclusions should be made: 1) despite the collapse of the USSR, in 1990s South Caucasus, as an independent geopolitical region, still remained as “*the interior area of the Russian influence*” and did not present a prominent importance in the global geopolitics, 2) Georgian revolution in 2003 reorganized the geopolitical balance of the region in favor of the USA and Turkey, 3) the EU became one of the “permanent players” along with the Russian Federation, Turkey and the USA, 4) the realization of energy programs highly *augmented the geopolitical importance* of the South Caucasus and made it a transit corridor, connecting Europe with Central Asia.

## References

- [1] “Armenian Highland” in Encyclopædia Britannica,  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/35301/Armenian-Highland>.
- [2] S. A. Somel, Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire, (Scarecrow Press Inc.), p. 306,

2003.

- [3] S. E. Cornell, *The South Caucasus: A Regional and Conflict Assessment*, p. 51, 2002.
- [4] S. E. Cornell, *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia*, pp. 206-209, 213-214, 221-223, 2002.
- [5] Istanbul Document 1999, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Istanbul, 1999, <http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true>.
- [6] National Security Concept of Georgia, [http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang\\_id=ENG&sec\\_id=12](http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12).
- [7] S. E. Cornell, *Georgia after the Rose revolution: geopolitical predicament and implications for U.S. policy*, p. 8, 2007.
- [8] S. E. Cornell, N. L.P. Swanström, A. Tabyshaliev, G. Tcheishvili, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis of the South Caucasus with a Focus on Georgia*, p. 27, 2005.
- [9] M. H. Cecire, *Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan: trilateralism and the future of Black sea regional geopolitics*, *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, vol. 15, No. 20, pp.7-10, 2013.
- [10] L. Evoian, *Georgia's involvement in the Turkish-Azerbaijani military alliance*, "21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY", No. 1 (47), pp. 20-31, 2013.
- [11] "102-ya voennaja baza Gruppy rossijskix vojsk v Zakavkaz'e" ([102<sup>nd</sup> military base of the Group of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia], *in Russian*), <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/152315/>.
- [12] Statement of President Serzh Sargsyan at the third Armenian-Russian Interregional Forum, <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2013/12/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-Gyumri-armenian-russian-forum/>.
- [13] "Evrazijskij proekt dlja Armenii: Èkonomičeskie preimuščestva i obščestvennyj dialog" ([Eurasian project for Armenia: Economic priorities and social dialogue], *in Russian*), [http://www.soyuzinfo.am/rus/analitics/detail.php?ELEMENT\\_ID=724](http://www.soyuzinfo.am/rus/analitics/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=724).
- [14] M. Soghomonyan, "Mec' Britaniayi navtayin qaghaqakanut'yuny' Haravayin Kovkasum" ([Oil policy of the Great Britain in the South Caucasus], *in Armenian*), "21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY", No. 1 (15), pp. 58-77, 2007.
- [15] History of TRACECA, <http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/history-of-traceca/>.
- [16] S. E. Cornell, M. Tsereteli and Vladimir Socor, *Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline*, *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, pp. 17-39, 2005.
- [17] S. E. Cornell, *Pipeline Power: The War in Georgia and the Future of the Caucasian Energy Corridor*, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 10, No. 1, pp. 131-139, 2009.
- [18] V. Papava, *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Georgia*, *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, pp. 85-102, 2005.
- [19] Z. Baran, *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey*, *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, pp. 103-118, 2005.
- [20] R. L. Larsson, *Europe and Caspian Energy: Dodging Russia, Tackling China, and Engaging the U.S.*, *Europe's Energy Security: Gazprom's Dominance and Caspian Supply Alternatives*, pp. 19-41, 2008.
- [21] A. Zhorzholiani, *Will Georgia follow Armenia's path towards Eurasian Union*, *Central Asia-*

*Caucasus Analyst*, vol. 15, No. 18, pp. 19-21, 2013.

[22] A. Grigoryan, Russia advances its positions in the South Caucasus, *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, vol. 15, No. 22, pp. 11-14, 2013.

This paper is presented at **INTCESS14- International Conference on Education and Social Sciences**, 3rd -5th February, 2014, at Nippon Hotel, Istanbul Turkey and published in the *Proceedings of INTCESS14- International Conference on Education and Social Sciences, 3-5 February 2014- Istanbul, Turkey*. Also the abstract can be found on:  
<http://www.ocerint.org/index.php/digital-library>

#### Suggested Citation

Erik Davtyan. "South Caucasus and the Global Geopolitics", *Proceedings of INTCESS14- International Conference on Education and Social Sciences, 3-5 February 2014- Istanbul, Turkey*, pp. 717-725.