Abstract. In late March 1987 Turkey and Greece were dragged into a crisis over oil exploration and exploitation rights in the Aegean Sea that brought them to the brink of war. Indeed, war was avoided in the last minute, and only after significant pressure was applied by NATO officials and US diplomats. Soon after the 1987 crisis the two states engaged in an unusual type of “shuttle diplomacy” which eventually led to the initiation of the Davos Process in January 1988. Although the significance of the 1987 crisis was excessive, some of its most interesting aspects remain unknown.

The first goal of the paper is to shed light on the Turkish perspective of the 1987 crisis. The Turkish narrative of the March 1987 events not only complements but also juxtaposes the Greek narrative, which remains incoherent especially regarding the diffusion of the crisis, as well as the winners and the losers of the crisis. The second goal is to examine the decision-making process, which took place in the Turkish side in the absence of the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was at the time in the USA for health related issues, and analyze how this process influenced Turkey’s position during the crisis.

The current study aims at providing a better understanding to scholars and policy makers of the dynamics and processes that take place during an interstate crisis.