EVIDENTIALITY IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE

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Abstract

This article is aimed at making a cross-linguistic analysis of evidentials and their meaning in German and Kazakh argumentative discourse. It provides an overview of similarities and differences of expression of evidentials in two typologically different languages. The comparative analysis of the argumentation in the cognitive-intercultural aspect using the example of typologically different languages makes it possible to find out the peculiarities of expressive means of this category in the discourse. In the present paper we made an attempt to define the types of grammatical means of evidentials that determine source of information since they contribute greatly to the development of cognitive-pragmatic functions in the discourse. Evidentiality expresses a source of information and reflects the subjective opinion of the speaker, the degree of the speaker’s knowledge of the objective situation and his/her beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes to objective reality in the argumentative discourse. The conducted linguistic analysis in two typologically different languages helped to identify two basic types of information that determine the subjective character of argumentative discourse – reliable and indirect information. Argumentation is based on the reliable information known to the subject due to his/her personal experience or observations. On the indirect information the subject cannot pass a reliable judgment without making certain logical conclusions. The cross-linguistic analysis of evidentials and their meaning in German and Kazakh argumentative discourse showed that the speaker’s degree of awareness and nature of knowledge, and the degree of subjective confidence in the reliability of the things said are reflected in the semantics of modal words.

Keywords: Evidentiality, Argumentation, Discourse, Source of Information

1. INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the present article lies in the study of aargumentation in the cognitive-pragmatic aspect. The study of cognitive mechanisms reflecting the category of an argumentation in linguistic consciousness of the subject is becoming more and more significant. The research presented in this article is aimed to make a cross-linguistic analysis of explicit and implicit means of verbalization of evidentiality in German and Kazakh
argumentative discourse. Here we provide an overview of the similarities and differences between the meaning of evidentials in German and Kazakh argumentative discourse. We have applied descriptive-analytic, transformational methods, contextual analysis and used belles-lettres discursive German and Kazakh texts as the research material.

To achieve the goal we made an attempt to identify evidentially modified segments of the discourse, define the type of information source and specify the means of its verbalization in German and Kazakh. The main hypothesis of this paper is as follows: evidentiality in the argumentative discourse manifest in its subjective meanings that contain the indirect evidence resulting from some non-factive information and direct evidence resulting from observed events.

The present paper focuses on the cognitive aspect of an argumentation that reflects knowledge or lack of knowledge, and the speaker’s confidence in the issue under discussion. The research of an argumentation in cognitive aspect also includes the speaker’s knowledge of information source in the speech situation. The argumentative discourse reflects not to the primary cause-effect relations in the real world but to the transposition of the given relations into the speaker’s mental sphere. In this paper we also focus on the study of the types of grammatical means of evidentials that determine source of information.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we describe linguistic studies that deal with argumentative discourse. Section 3 is dedicated to the methodology applied to studying evidentials in argumentative discourse. Argumentation arises in the mental area of logical conclusions and develop into a hypothesis and conclusion put forward by the speaker. Taking this into account, we made an attempt to compare the explicit and implicit meanings of evidentials in German and Kazakh argumentative discourse. The main results of this study are presented in Section 3.

1.1 Argumentative discourse

The cognitive investigation of the argumentation is based on the theory of discourse structure and discourse meaning (Dijk 1997, Grosz & Sidner 1986, Kashuba 2001, Kyoung-Nam Han 2010, by Heusinger & Chiriacescu 2013, Fraas 2016), accordingly the discourse is understood as linguistic process of reproducing the real world by people. Therefore, discourse analysis allows us to find out the connection of language with extralinguistic reality. According to Kindt, the term “argumentation” is understood as (after that):

„eine Sprechhandlung oder Sprechhandlungssequenz, mit deren Hilfe versucht wird, die Geltung einer Aussage B in einer Situation (oder in einem Kontext) nachzuweisen oder zu widerlegen (Kindt 2007, 24).

Argumentative discourse is further developed in many linguistic studies. It reflects the relationship between thoughts in the mental domain of conclusions and arguments (Kindt 2007; Kindt 2007a; Gnüchtel 2016; Habermas 1983; Gottschak 2000; Kijko 2013). Argumentative discourse as an outward chain pursues a communicative-pragmatic aim of convincing the interlocutor in truthfulness of his opinions, judgments and views. In the process of argumentation, the speaker demonstrates his extralinguistic, linguistic and communicative competence, his knowledge, his ideas, his epistemic modality, his emotional state as well as his social status and his social roles are also involved. The speaker expresses in discourse his attitude towards the predicative part of the utterance and his degree of knowledge and certainty about the object of the utterance.

In the cognitive-pragmatic aspect argumentation is studied as a thinking, logical-semantic category that has an epistemic form of thinking as its basis. Scholars see the cognitive process of reflection of argumentation when they are manifested in the human mental activity of forming logical conclusions (Gnüchtel 2016; Gottschak 2000; Kijko 2013 Habermas 1983; Dalbergenova 2018). Pragmatically, argumentative discourse is considered as justifying utterances, where the speaker creates causal relations between utterances and other circumstances (Pasch, 2003; Stukker & Sanders 2012).

The argumentative discourse expresses relations between thoughts and judgments; it is the act of forming logical conclusions or assumptions. In this case definite observed events and circumstances serve as the basis for the speaker to draw a conclusion about the event that caused these circumstances. Argumentative discourse expresses the speaker’s personality and his or her wishes, views and communicative intentions, thus gaining subjective status too.

1.2 Evidentials in argumentative discourse

The principal theory of this work is the theory of argumentation as the interaction of perception, presentation and production of information. That is the relevance of the theory of evidentiality, which expresses a source
of information, is doubtless. Evidence, as a linguistic category according to the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, covers the available facts, circumstances, supporting or otherwise a belief or indicating whether or not a thing is true or valid (Aikhenvald 2004). The evidentiality is studied in modern linguistic science as a grammatical system. In some languages the marking of grammatical evidentials is obligatory; otherwise it is an ‘incomplete’ sentence, for example in Panoan language from Peru (Valenzuela 2003: 34). Only in some systems an evidential is clear from the context, the speaker can say explicitly or implicitly what he knows and describe his knowledge of information source (Frajzyngier 1985: 25). Our task is to find out markings of evidential in Kazak and German languages in the argumentative discourse formally.

The evidentiality has become the object of interest in many linguistic studies. These studies are aimed to define the speaker’s scope of knowledge, his/her views on the events described and find out the speaker’s representation of information source (Anderson 1986: 274; Willett 1988: 55; van der Auwera/Plungian 1998: 85; de Haan 1999: 2; Palmer 2001: 8; Plungian 2001: 351; de Haan 2001a: 201).

“Evidentiality is a grammatical marking of how we know something – whether we saw it happen, or heard it, or smelt it, or inferred what was happening based on logical assumption, or on a result we can see, or just were told about it” (Aikhenvald&Dixon 2014).

In some linguistic studies the concept of evidentiality is considered identical to that of epistemic mode (Palmer 2001; Plungian 2001; Willett 1988). Thus, Palmer (2001) investigated evidentiality and epistemic mode of the speaker, namely the evaluation of the information that entered into the focus of his/her consciousness. According to the author, both of them reflect the viewpoint of the speaker and occupy the central position in the discourse. The focus of this study is evidentials in argumentative discourse because it is at the level that the subjective nature of argumentation comprises the perspective and opinion of the speaker. Our task is to ascertain the types of evidentials and their cognitive-pragmatic functions as the foundation of argumentation. Our hypothesis therefore comprises the notion that the person, his or her inner world and knowledge of the information and evidentiality occupy the key position in the argumentative discourse.

We assume evidentiality to be the reflection of the objective reality in the speaker’s epistemic mode, in which the speaker, his/her mental operations, views and perception of the objective world make the core of the discursive texts.

The notion of evidentiality is of particular interest for this study because it most clearly reflects the ‘work’ of the speaker’s consciousness at the time of speech production and his or her mental mode with regard to the relative probability and reliability of the propositional content of the utterance. The speaker’s consciousness describes the situations, determines the existence of events and links them with each other causally, with his or her mental mode, cognitive understanding of objective reality and degree of knowledge about objective events serving as the argument for the formation of his argumentation.


The speaker intends to convince the listener in truthfulness of his statement; moreover, he argues his epistemic attitude on the basis of visually perceptible facts. So, in the discourse of direct perception, the speaker appears as a source of direct evidence. We call this discourse perception-based evidence. For example:

(4) Peter soll zu Hause sein, denn ich habe das Licht in seinem Zimmer gesehen [Peter should be at home because I saw the light in his room]

This idea can also be expressed shorter:

(5) Peter soll zu Hause sein, denn das Licht in seinem Zimmer brennt [Peter should be at home, because the light is burning in his room]. The speaker claims that Peter is at home, basing his utterance on direct evidence (I’ve seen the light in his room on).

According to Willet, indirect evidence means inferring evidence (Willet 1988, ebd.), the reported evidence of «the hearsay» is the reproduction of the heard or read information, inferring evidence is to derive by reasoning; conclude or judge from premises or evidence. The speaker is uncertain of his arguments,
connects the inference with epistemic uncertainty, and acts as a source of indirect evidence:

(6) Peter is wahrscheinlich zu Hause, das Licht brenne in seinem Zimmer [Peter is probably home, the light is burning in his room].

(7) Peter ist wahrscheinlich zu Hause, denn jemand musste das Licht in seinem Zimmer gesehen haben [Peter is probably home, because someone must have seen the light in his room].

2. MATERIAL AND METHODS

In the article we make an attempt to show the order of argumentative structures:

Argument: (p) He is at home. Consequence (q): That is why the light is on. Deductive inference: I see q, conclude that p.

Possible periphrasis: I am sure that he is at home and the reason for this assumption is the fact that I see light in his place.

Let us consider another example: (1) Tschick stand jetzt direkt vor ihnen. Sie starnten ihn an, als ob sie ihn nicht erkennen würden, und wahrscheinlich erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht. Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf [Chik stood in front of them. They stared at him as if they did not recognize him, and, possibly, they did not because Chik wore my sunglasses] (W. Herrndorf, Tschick)

This argumentative discourse does not establish a causal relationship between the facts and the events, but expresses an argumentation, i.e. the connection between the observed state of affairs and the speaker’s judgment on the probable consequence of this state. The speaker assumes that friends do not recognize Chik (wahrscheinlich erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht), and the assumption results from the fact that Chik wears sunglasses (Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf). The assumption is expressed here by the modal word wahrscheinlich, which is the key word in the whole argumentative construction. The attitude of the speaker to the assumed result (I assume that friends possibly do not recognize Chik) is a logical conclusion resulting from the observed facts of reality and the speaker’s perception (because I know and see that Chik wears my sunglasses).

This argumentative connection can be depicted as a relationship between the argument (Arg.) and the effect component (consequence (Cons.)): Arg. → caus. → Cons.:

Assumption (wahrscheinlich erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht) [possibly they did not recognize him] ← caus. ← argument (Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf) [because Chik wore sunglasses].

In the present work we will define argumentative as a type of connection existing between the proposed cause (p) or direct evidence and the epistemically modified consequent (q):

Inferring evidence (wahrscheinlich [possibly, perhaps] = I suppose that p)+propositional content (erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht) [they did not recognize him].

Direct evidence – Proposition (Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf) [because Chik wore sunglasses].

Argumentative Discourse = Inferring evidence caus. Direct evidence [Proposition].

The argumentative discourse in the described example (1) is an epistemic hypothesis “suppose” (I suppose that p), the evidence or the source of assumption is expressed by the modal word wahrscheinlich (‘may be’). The subjectivity of consciousness is highlighted through modal expressions that show the degree and scope of knowledge. The modal expression ‘may be’ bears the semantics of the ‘assumed truth’: I assume (it may be) that p. The speaker is unaware about any direct cause or an argument and draws conclusions and assumptions on the basis of the objective state of affairs and on the basis of direct evidence. In (5), the fact, the speaker’s knowledge of information and the direct evidence Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf (Chik wears my sunglasses) is the argument for the speaker’s conclusions erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht (they did not recognize him). The speaker as the subject of consciousness assumes that it could be the consequence of the fact that another person has the glasses of the speaker. The subjective perspective of the utterance are marked by the evidence formal meaning – modal expression wahrscheinlich (‘may be, possibly’). The argumentative discourse is (represents in the way) the cognitive operation of the conclusion.

Discursive texts taken from German and Kazakh belles-lettres fiction serve in the present paper as research materials. Among the analysed works there are W. Herrndorf’s Tschick, D. Kehlmann’s Die Vermessung der
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The evidentiality reflects the speaker’s source of knowing the observed events, the degree of statement reliability, and the speaker’s subjective confidence in the truthfulness of the statement. The modern linguistics do not have any contrastive research describing the means of evidence in German and Kazakh languages. The relevance therefore lies in the linguistic means which express the evidential functions in two typologically different languages.

The examples (1) and (2) demonstrate that modal words marking the source of this knowledge help to define the speaker’s deductive conclusions and speech tactics.

(1) Tschick stand jetzt direkt vor ihnen. Sie starren ihn an, als ob sie ihn nicht erkennen würden, und wahrscheinlich erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht. Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf (Chik stood in front of them. They stared at him as if they did not recognize him, and, possibly, they did not because Chik wore my sunglasses) [W. Herrndorf, Tschick].

(2) Kaigly atany os oimen, os dertimen onascha kalduy kazhet siyakty. Oitkeni onyn zhanagy sholak byiryk sosden baskatil katar zhok. Myndasar da oiy zhok Ne de bolsa bar zharasymen bir osi gana bolgysy kelgendi. (Perhaps we should leave the mourning grandfather alone with his thoughts and grief. For the only thing he had to say was a short order. He needs no one to share his grief with. Whatever awaits him, he wants to stay alone with his sorrow) (M. Auesov, Abai zholy).

In the given examples we find argumentation existing between the direct evidence (Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf (because Chik wore my sunglasses)) (Oitkeni onyn zhanagy sholak byiryk sosden baskatil katar zhok. [Because the only thing he had to say was a short order]) and the indirect (inferring) evidence – the speaker’s judgment on the possible consequence of this fact (wahrscheinlich erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht (possibly, they did not recognize him)) (Kaigly atany os oimen, os dertimen onascha kalduy kazhet siyakty [Perhaps we should leave the mourning grandfather alone with his thoughts and grief]). The first part of the sentence expresses the inferring evidence, and the subjunctive clause expresses the argument supporting the hypothesis as they have direct source of information. The given argumentative discourse consists in the fact that the evidentiality, which contains non-factive information in other words the indirect source of information. The explicit formal meanings in both languages are the modal words wahrscheinlich (possibly) and siyakty (should).

The inferring evidence expresses the person’s inner world and mental sphere and acquires the functional status of an alleged consequence. The transformation method demonstrates the evidentiality of argumentative discourse – the connection between the mode of assumption and observed events:

1a Ich nehme an (vermunte, denke), dass sie ihn wirklich nicht erkannten. Denn Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf [I assume (believe, see, think), they did not recognize Chik, for sure, as he wore my sunglasses].

2a Men oilaamin Kaigly atany os oimen, os dertimen onascha kalduy kazhet siyakty. Oitkeni onyn zhanagy sholak byiryk sosden baskatil katar zhok. Myndasar da oiy zhok Ne de bolsa bar zharasymen bir osi gana bolgysy kelgendi [I assume (believe, see, think), we should leave the mourning grandfather alone with his thoughts and grief. Because the only thing he had to say was a short order. He needs no one to share his grief with. Whatever awaits him, he wants to stay alone with his sorrow].

Consequently, the subject of speech is the author of the argumentative discourse who knows two types of
information: nonfactivity (consequence) and factivity (argument).

In short the model of this type of argumentative discourse can be presented in the following way:

1) \{Assumption \[q\] \leftarrow caus. \leftarrow \{Argument denn \[p]\}

Let us compare:

\{Assumption \[wahrscheinlich \] erkannten sie ihn wirklich nicht\} \leftarrow caus. \leftarrow \{Argument \[Denn \] Tschick hatte meine Sonnenbrille auf\}.

The analogous model in Kazakh looks this way:

\{Assumption \[Kaigyly atany os oimen, os dertimen onascha kaldytu kazhet siyakty \{Perhaps we should leave the mourning grandfather alone with his thoughts and grief\}\} \leftarrow caus. \leftarrow \{Argument \[Oitkeni onyn zhanagy sholak byiryk sosden baskatil katar zhok \{Because the only thing he had to say was a short order\}\}.

Consequently, argumentations as constructions of logical reasoning are evaluative means in the mental activity of the agent; principal clauses containing the modal words express evaluative attitudes of the situation, in other words, there occurs a convergence of semantic meanings of assumptions and evaluation.

Thus, in example (2), the speaker’s evaluation urges him to leave the man alone with his thoughts (\{onasha kaldyru kazhet siyakty\}) because he has nothing more to say.

Argumentative discourse explains the knowledge structure in the mind of the speaker who has two types of information: factivity and non-factivity. (factive and non-factive) – The speaker is himself the source of direct and indirect evidences. Indirect evidence is the speaker’s utterance which is based on the degree of subjective knowledge of the approved events (asserted events). That means that the argumentative construction formed by the speaker doesn’t correspond to reality (not fit) and in fact can’t exist, it reflects the speaker's position to objective reality.

As a result, the relationship arises between the lack of knowledge and the actual situation. The non-factuality of either component is characteristic of the subjective view of argumentative discourse and is called indirect evidence. We call the observed facts as direct evidence, with which the speaker can argue his epistemic knowledge. The indirect evidence is expressed in German by the subjunctive mood.

\(3)\) Jemand musste sie von weitem gesehen und angekündigt haben, denn wenige Minuten nachdem sie in den Hof eingefahren waren, flog die Haustür auf, und vier Männer liefen ihnen entgegen Someone must have seen and announced them from afar, because a few minutes after they entered the yard, the front door flew open and four men ran to meet them (D. Kehlmann. Die Vermessung der Welt).

This argumentative discourse is characterized by a strong subjectivity, both of its components are based on non-factual information. The source of the first component is indirect evidence – the reproduction of the heard information or a guess. (Jemand musste sie von weitem gesehen und angekündigt haben), which is the basis for the speaker's assumption. The grammatical means of indirect evidentials is marked by verbs in the Conjunctive form (\{gesehen und angekündigt haben\}).

The contrastive investigation of the evidential represents the similarities and differences of the means of expression. The next statement from the Kazakh novel «Abai sholy» by M. M. Auesov and their translation versions in German illustrate quite clearly the differences of two language systems. For example:

\(9)\) Myra balanyng auyiga asygyn-ai! Sory bala kistai isch kysta bolyp kalgan-au, desedi \{Well, the boy is in a hurry to the village. Poor fellow! Apparently, he spent the whole winter in school with boredom\}. (M. Auesov. Abaisholy).

The speaker justifies his astonishment at the boy’s hurry, as one of the possible argument for the boy’s haste he calls the boy’s homesickness. The described facts are evaluated by the speaker as a source: the postposition -au in Kazakh expresses at the same time the compassion (regred) and the high degree of uncertainty. This statement is justified by the verb of indirect evidence (the hearsay) desedi [one says].

The comparative analysis of the argumentation in the cognitive-intercultural aspect using the example of typologically different languages makes it possible to find out two types of evidence in the discourse: direct (observed event) and indirect (inferring and reported).

In the present paper we defined the types of grammatical means of evidentials that determine source of information. The analysis of the material also revealed some dissimilarities in the compared languages: in the German language the indirect evidence meaning can be expressed explicitly by verbs in the subjunctive
form whereas in Kazakh argumentative discourse this type of evidence is expressed by the particle -au and by the verb of indirect evidence (the hearsay) desedi [one says].

The German language as the language of inflectional type uses different forms of the verb to express indirect speech medium – indirect evidence to argue his opinion whereas Kazakh as the language of agglutinative type apart from grammatical markers uses such morphological means as postpositions -au, -ai. The German language doesn’t have such morphological means. Lexical equivalent means desedi [one says] which is in German the combination of the verb in the 3rd person singular and the indefinite-personal pronoun: "man sagt".

Thus, evidentiality in argumentative discourse manifests in the speaker’s inner mental world, his/her views and opinions, types of information, and degree of reliability. Indirect evidence as signs of subjectivity include the argumentation of the inferring information that is based on some facts and the incomplete awareness of the subject of the factive state of affairs. The conducted linguistic analysis helped to identify two basic types of information that determine the subjective character of argumentative discourse – reliable and indirect information. Argumentation is based on the reliable information known to the subject due to his/her personal experience or observations. On the indirect information the subject cannot pass a reliable judgment without making certain logical conclusions.

The comparative analysis of the argumentation in the cognitive-intercultural aspect has identified the similarities and the differences of expressing evidentials in two typologically different languages. It is necessary to note the similarity of modal words as means expressing indirect evidences in both typologically different languages. The speaker’s indirect evidence and his degree of awareness and nature of knowledge, and the degree of subjective confidence in the reliability of the things said are reflected in the semantics of modal words. These are the examples of modal words reflecting indirect evidences in Kazakh and German: shygar balkim (possibly), balki (possibly), siyakty (should) and mumkyn (possibly); wahrscheinlich (probably), and wohl (perhaps). Non-factivity of one of the argumentative components is the specific feature that makes different this type of relations from objective reason-consequence relations:

Consequent (Mode of assumption, hypothesis) ← Caus. ← Argument (Fact of reality, direct evidence)

Thus the analysis of the practical material helps us to conclude that the subjective meaning of the argumentation is reached in the discourse by means of deductive conclusions uniting thoughts into a row of messages and judgments. The individuality of the thinking speaker most clearly manifests itself in the indirect evidence. By evaluating various situations and fragments of reality and by creating various argumentative constructions the speaker expresses his/her personal attitude of the observed events.

Evidentiality German and Kazakh languages demonstrate the universal nature of the argumentation, and is a means of receiving the conceptual knowledge of causal relations in the objective and subjective world, regardless of the typological structure and the genetic origin of the language. The language content is determined by the system and the objective nature of linguistic consciousness, which is at the same time specific to a particular national manifestation.

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